A monopolist in public transport may oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum, as van Reeven (2008) demonstrates with homogeneous consumers. This result generalizes for heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable. Whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends on the degree of consumers' heterogeneity as reflected in the distribution of consumers' reservation prices. Oversupply is likely to occur when this distribution is peaked, and undersupply is likely to occur when this distribution is rather flat. In particular, monopoly production results in the oversupply of frequency when consumers' reservation prices are concentrated around the entry costs of the private car, being the main alternative to public transport.
Introduction
Current levels of subsidization in public transport make it difficult to accept that no generally valid economic justification exists for these subsidies. Traditional economic arguments for subsidizing public transport, such as economies in production, second-best, and distributional equity, have proven to be weak (see, e.g., De Borger et al., 2002 , Hencher, 1998 , Paulley et al., 2006 , Small, 1992 . The final remaining argument is due to Mohring (1972) , who argues that public transport exhibits user economies that result in underproduction. However, van Reeven (2008) shows that the modeling assumptions in Mohring (1972) do not result in underproduction and, therefore, subsidization of public transport is not an imperative.
In this journal, Savage and Small (2009) and Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009) argue that the consumer homogeneity assumption is critical in van Reeven (2008) , and that a monopolist will undersupply frequency when consumers are heterogeneous and have downward-sloping demand. Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009) demonstrate this for the uniform distribution of consumers' reservation prices, which results in a linearly decreasing demand function. Savage and Small (2009) show that the shape of the distribution is irrelevant in this respect.
As long as consumers do not know the timetable, any distribution that leads to a downwardsloping demand schedule results in the under-provision of frequency. Savage and Small argue that this result becomes ambiguous if consumers know the timetable, as both undersupply and oversupply can occur.
Van Reeven (2008) shows that consumers have an incentive to get to know the timetable.
Learning the times of departure reduces their waiting costs. This unambiguously increases the demand for transportation so that operators have an incentive to publish the timetable.
Hence, in a general equilibrium framework, consumers must be informed. In this paper, we generalize van Reeven (2008) to heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable. The results of this generalization are as follows.
Whether monopoly oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends on a trade-off between two effects. The first effect is the traditional result that a monopolist prices above marginal cost, which results in the production of a lower quantity than is socially desirable.
In an equilibrium context, this creates an incentive to undersupply frequency relative to the social optimum.
The second effect is pointed out by Spence (1975) . A social planner looks at the effect of an increase in quality (read: frequency) on all consumers in average, whereas the monopolist considers this effect on the marginal consumer. In public transport, for optimally chosen departure times (see van Reeven, 2008 , for the uniform distribution, and Janssen et al., 2005, for non-uniform distributions), the marginal consumer, i.e., the consumer who is indifferent between two consecutive departures times, has a waiting time that is twice as large as the waiting time of an average consumer. This creates an incentive to oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum.
The balance of these two forces is determined by the distribution of consumers' reservation prices. In van Reeven (2008) , consumers are homogeneous, and the distribution is degenerate and concentrated at the utility level of an outside option, e.g., private car, in the spirit of Salop (1979) . This eliminates the incentive to undersupply frequency, and the monopolist oversupplies with informed consumers, and is socially optimal with uninformed consumers. In Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009) , to the contrary, consumers' reservation prices are distributed evenly, which is the opposite case. This eliminates the incentive to oversupply frequency, so that the monopolist strictly undersupplies.
Using the family of the power distribution functions, which has the homogeneous consumer case of van Reeven (2008) on one hand, and the uniform distribution of Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009) on the other, as two opposite limiting cases, we show that there is a critical degree of heterogeneity with the following property. If the heterogeneity in consumer reservation price is stronger than the critical level, the undersupply result occurs. If, to the contrary the heterogeneity is weaker, the monopolist oversupplies. This illustrates the argument of Savage and Small (2009) that undersupply and, therefore, subsidization of public transport is not an imperative.
Without an empirical investigation of the shape of the distribution function of consumers' reservation prices, theoretical modeling will hardly shed a new light on the likelihood of undersupply/oversupply outcomes. Considering private car as the main alternative to public transport, it is reasonable to assume that consumers' reservation prices are concentrated around the entry costs of the car. This concentration makes oversupply just as likely as undersupply.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model which is then analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We build the model of a monopolist that provides a public transport service on van Reeven . Thus, the monopoly profit is given by
is the demand for public transport, i.e., the measure of consumers who get non-negative surplus from using the service at price p. 
is the aggregate consumer surplus.
Social welfare maximizing, i.e., the first best, values of x, p, and f are denoted by 
The analysis
We begin with computing aggregate demand and consumer surplus. Let us fix values of
, and a single departure time y, and only consider consumers with most preferred departure times from the interval
. All such consumers, if they opt for using the service, will depart at time y because it is their closest departure time.
Suppose that x is chosen optimally so that monopoly profit or social welfare is strictly positive. Then, when 
get negative surplus from the service:
These consumers do not use the public transport service and get zero consumer surplus:
get positive surplus from the service irrespective of their most preferred departure time i y :
These consumers use the public transport service and get consumer surplus:
c) Consumers with reservation price
[ ]
get positive surplus from the service only when 0
, that is, when their most preferred departure time i y belongs to the following interval:
8 Such consumers use the public transport service and get consumer surplus: 
In order to find aggregate consumer demand, we differentiate (the negative of) the aggregate consumer surplus with respect to price:
It is worth to note at this stage that when consumers are uninformed, they all experience waiting disutility 2 / x , and the aggregate consumer surplus ( )
which will lead to the following aggregate demand from uninformed consumers
as argued by Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009).
However, this is just a coincidence and demands ( )
The monopoly profit function ( ) ( ) ( )
Hence, the first-best price is zero, 0 = FB p , so that the social planner chooses
order to maximize the following (reduced-form) social welfare function: As the first best and profit maximizing values depend on the distribution of reservation prices through the parameter k, we often write them as functions of k explicitly.
Whether monopoly profit and social welfare are positive or negative depends on the exogenous value of ct . Apart from k, this product of fixed cost c and unit waiting cost t is the only exogenous entry in the objective functions ( )
When the monopolist gets non-negative profits, social welfare is non-negative as well. In what follows, we assume that the value of the product ct is sufficiently low so that a monopoly is operational for any 1 ≥ k . In particular, we assume that 27 / 4 = < C ct . Next, we will relax this assumption and discuss the case C ct > , for which the monopoly profit might become negative for some values of k.
In the following proposition, we generalize the result of van Reeven (2008) , which is obtained for the limiting case when k unboundedly increases, and which we formally (with slight abuse of the notation) denote by ∞ = k . We show that the monopolist always oversupplies frequency when the distribution density function of consumers' reservation prices sufficiently increases, which is measured by parameter k.
Proposition 1.
For all large values of k, the monopolist over-produces frequency, i.e., there , and the statement of the proposition follows.
Proof. Van Reeven (2008) shows that in the limit when
5 For a fixed level of ct , the value of t has its own and independent of ct effect on the frequency 
By subtracting the first equation from the second one and rearranging, we get:
It is easy to see that ( ) ( ) ( )
, where 
, which reflects consumer heterogeneity, is relatively small, the first effect is weak and the desire of the monopolist to increase consumer demand by choosing higher level of frequency drives the oversupply result. When, to the contrary, the reservation price distribution is more even, the first effect is strong, monopoly output is low, and, consequently, frequency will be undersupplied. 
Thus, monopoly is operational for C ct < . . As a result, the monopolist has a much lower incentive to reduce frequency as the required decrease in price has a strong adverse effect on monopoly profit.
In the analysis, we have assumed C ct < so that monopoly is operational for any k. For a given value of k, there is a range of ct values where monopoly does not produce even though it would have been socially optimal. Savage and Small (2009) point out that subsidizing the monopolist in this case is a solution to this market failure. We now turn to this market failure and have a closer look at the impact of subsidization. , i.e., the monopoly must receive additional subsidy in order to able to produce this lower frequency profitably. However, such additional subsidy does not give any incentive to do so unless the first best level of frequency is explicitly imposed on the monopolist.
We are now able to relax our assumption C ct < and extend our computations by assuming that the monopolist gets a lump-sum subsidy if its profit is negative. Figure 4 represents the parameter space with , and therefore is even more likely to happen.
Finally, we admit that the original model of van Reeven (2008) , as well as this generalization, is very stylized. Savage and Small (2009) argue that a richer model is required for the proper analysis of the monopoly frequency choice. Nevertheless, even these simple models make it clear that theoretically oversupply is equally likely to happen as undersupply.
Extending the model will certainly change the balance of the effects presented here.
However, it is not obvious that such extensions will favor undersupply. For example, increasing marginal production cost (e.g., due to increasing boarding and alighting costs when marginal waiting cost increases the difference in utility between the average and the marginal consumers and, therefore, further increases the incentive to oversupply. Hence, oversupply is even more likely to happen under these assumptions.
Conclusion
Van Reeven (2008) shows that monopoly does not undersupply frequency if consumers are homogeneous with respect to their reservation price. This result generalizes to the case of heterogeneous consumers when the distribution density function of consumers' reservation price peaks. In contrast, when consumers are very heterogeneous, so that reservation prices are distributed evenly and the distribution function rather flat, the monopolist undersupplies frequency. Hence, the question whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies frequency critically depends on how heterogeneous the costs of alternative means of travel are.
Since the private car is the main alternative to public transport, consumers' reservation prices are likely to be concentrated around the entry costs of the private car. The distribution density function may include some other peaks for other alternatives to public transport as well. These concentrations in the distribution function make oversupply just as likely as undersupply. It very much depends on the particular case at hand and requires empirical research on the exact shape of the distribution of consumers' reservation prices, as well as other effects that are omitted in our analysis for simplicity.
The main implication from the analysis is that the oversupply of frequency by a monopolist in public transport cannot be excluded, so that subsidization in public transport is not an imperative. For many years, the transport economic literature has been preoccupied with aligning economic theory with increasing subsidization of public transport in practice. It generalizes and improves Mohring's original model with a better representation of user costs.
Every improvement has come with even higher levels of optimal production, as shown, e.g., by Jara- Díaz and Gschwender (2003) , justifying ever-increasing subsidies to public transport operations. In this respect, van Reeven (2008) may have put the cat among the pigeons, whereas this paper provides a more balanced view on the topic. However, the main conclusion remains the same: just the fact that consumers' waiting costs are external to the public transport monopolist does not constitute a generally valid economic justification for subsidization of public transport.
